If Kamala Harris’s campaign to become president of the United States is so far a matter of joyful vibes, then they’ve certainly been felt in Canada. Two-thirds of Canadians told a recent survey they hold favourable views of the vice president, and one-third say they’re relieved by the apparently revived challenge she and Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz pose to the Republican ticket.
But although much of this enthusiasm is likely driven by a parallel dislike of former president Donald Trump (three-quarters of respondents), it might also be contributing to the perception that the Harris-Walz Democratic ticket will be especially good for Canada.
There are suggestions, for example, that the candidate harbours a special soft spot and warmth towards Canada after spending part of her teenage years in Montréal, where she attended both Westmount High School and Vanier College. Walz, her pick for vice-president, is also governor of a border state with important economic ties to Canada.
It’s certainly true that, following the more acrimonious nature of Canada-U.S. relations during the Trump administration, Harris joined President Joe Biden in restoring a more conciliatory and deferential tone when it came to Canada.
Applied to real policy, however, the reality is that this optimism is erroneous if not a little naïve about the policy objectives of both Democrats and Republicans.
Protectionist policies
In reality, the Biden administration not only maintained most of the tariffs put in place under Trump, but extended protectionist economic policy through a set of further measures, including a “Buy American” procurement policy contained within its Inflation Reduction Act.
It killed the Keystone XL pipeline, supported by Canadian federal and provincial governments, and showed little initiative in resolving the long-standing disputes around softwood lumber, dairy and electric vehicles.
At this point in the campaign, Harris has been evasive in specifying the details of her economic and trade policy. It is one parcel of a campaign that — having already taken the lead in national polling without much scrutiny — has embraced a safe and defensive posture. Yet, it’s likely the case that a Harris administration will maintain the approach of its immediate Democratic predecessor.
The reality is that, despite the frequent focus on the polarization of the American electorate, an enduring impact of the Trump presidency is that it has moved both Democrats and Republicans to converge on increasingly similar economic objectives.
That is, in contrast to the free trade and multilateralist orthodoxy of the past, both parties now want a more self-sufficient America with greater domestic manufacturing capacity.
The power of swing states
Part of this is electoral calculation. American elections are now decided by a handful of working-class voters in competitive states — Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, for example — that serve to benefit the most from this approach.
But it’s also the consequence of a changing international environment and how it’s shaped what it means to be a conservative or liberal. A decline in American international presence means that industrial capacity is now a matter of national security and self-determination, seen as a necessary means to undermine the influence of challengers like China.
Climate change suggests the need to shift to entirely new energy sources, supply chains and supportive infrastructure that world powers are now fighting over.
In this context, no powerful conservatives or liberals in the U.S. really support free trade or economic liberalization as ends in and of themselves. American conservatism is no longer about individual economic freedom; it’s shifted the focus of its attention towards priorities related to culture, community cohesion and national self-determination.
Liberals, while economically flexible, want to be able to finance a government that can pursue further social supports and progressive initiatives. Although the U.S. is divided, the source of conflict is largely over cultural and social questions, not economic ones.
This doesn’t mean that a future Harris or Trump administration would be synonymous. Both parties, for example, have significant disagreements over energy policy. While the Democrats are convinced that the green economy is the way to renewed industrial capacity, Republicans prioritize American self-sufficiency in cheap energy through the further development of natural sources, particularly natural gas.
Trump tariffs
At the same time, while Harris is likely to maintain the status quo already established by the two previous administrations, Trump has proposed further tariffs, including a 10 per cent across-the-board charge on almost all imports.
But even this is hard to evaluate with any certainty, as the Trump-Vance campaign has also been noticeably quiet on economic policy as well. The former president, for example, has suggested that tariffs can be threatened as a tool in trade negotiations, and important Republican figures continue to disagree on the exact way their economic goals should be achieved.
Overall, what matters is that — regardless of niceties or formal appearances — both administrations are prepared to continue a more forceful pursuit of American economic interest and self-capacity, even if it’s at the expense of Canada.
This is likely to come to a head in the upcoming review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) that is slated for 2026, as it opens the greatest opportunity for the American president to pursue change.
Of course, Canada-U.S. economic integration is essential to the prosperity of both countries, and existing arrangements are certain to remain in terms of broad contours. But in cases where specific industries or commodities are in conflict, Canadians should expect a less conciliatory and amicable American approach — even under a potential President Harris.
Sam Routley, PhD Candidate, Political Science, Western University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Expert Insight reflects the perspective and scholarly interest of Western faculty members and is not an articulation of official university policy on issues being addressed.